Not a badge wall. Every guarantee on this page is a mechanism you can inspect, test, and audit inside Tajo itself.
Tajo is an agentic system that builds and runs integrations against your customer data. That is exactly the kind of software that should have to prove it is behaving — so we built the proof into the runtime. Instead of asking you to trust a certification page, Tajo makes its core guarantees enforceable and checkable in the product: approvals are cryptographically bound to what they approve, execution attests to what it ran, the audit trail is tamper-evident, and anything that cannot prove it is allowed to run, doesn't.
When a human approves an integration, the approval is bound to a cryptographic digest of the exact configuration. The runtime will only execute what matches that digest — what you approved is, provably, what runs.
Every run attests to the published digest it executed under. If the running configuration and the approved configuration ever diverge, execution stops. There is no “close enough.”
Each audit entry is chained to the hash of the one before it. Removing or editing a record breaks the chain visibly. The history of what ran, who approved it, and what it touched is tamper-evident by construction.
A sync that cannot prove consent for the records it would move does not run. Not “runs with a warning” — does not run. Consent is a precondition the runtime enforces, not a checkbox in a settings page.
When the agent samples your data to draft an integration, previews show the shape of records — field names and types — not the values. Your customer data is not draft material.
Actions that write to external systems sit behind approval gates. Each approval is single-use, bound to the exact inputs it was granted for, and expires. An approval cannot be replayed or reused for a different payload.
The common thread in Tajo's design: when the system cannot prove an action is safe and approved, the action does not happen.
Every integration runs under explicit budget caps. When a cap is reached, work stops — it does not degrade into unmetered execution.
When a safety check cannot be evaluated — consent unprovable, digest mismatched, approval expired — the default is refusal. The system prefers doing nothing over doing something you did not sign off on.
The agent drafts and validates; it does not grant itself permission. Publication and risky writes require a human decision, and that decision is bound to the exact content being decided on.
You won't find a wall of compliance logos on this page. We think the more useful thing to show you is the machinery: ask us to walk you through the digest chain, the attestation records, or the audit log during an early access session, and we will — on your own workspace, with your own eyes on the evidence.
If you believe you have found a security issue in Tajo, we want to hear about it directly and quickly.
Join early access and we'll show you the approval chain, the attestation records, and the audit log running against a real integration.